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Different moods and emotions12/28/2023 The structure of the paper is as follows. Footnote 2 The paper also applies the intentional-evaluative model of affective shifts to anxiety in detail, developing the idea that the way our moods ‘develop’ into emotions can, in certain cases at least, allow for a kind of ‘release from affect’ which is arguably a central feature of psychological well-being. At same the time, the account is pitched at the phenomenological level, as dealing with affective shifts primarily in terms of moods and emotions as experiential states, with respect to which it feels-like-something to be undergoing the relevant experience. Footnote 1 I argue that we do best to understand important features of these affective shifts in terms of intentional and evaluative aspects of the respective states of moods and emotion. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas about affective shifts from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil (which were introduced into the contemporary discussion by Peter Goldie), a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Anxiety provides a central example: an occurrent emotion of anxiety about an upcoming medical test might diffuse into a generalized anxious mood which concerns ‘everything and nothing’ contrastingly, a generalized anxiety of the latter kind might become more ‘focused’, as expressed in an occurrent emotion of anxiety which targets a particular object, for example an upcoming event. It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. The paper also applies the intentional-evaluative model of affective shifts to anxiety in more detail, developing the idea that certain patterns of affective shift, particularly those that allow for a kind of ‘emotional release’, can contribute to a subject’s well-being. At same the time, the account is pitched at the phenomenological level, as dealing with affective shifts primarily in terms of moods and emotions as experiential states, with respect to which it feels-like-something to be undergoing the relevant affective experience. I argue that we do best to understand important features of these affective shifts–which I document across this paper–in terms of intentional and evaluative aspects of the respective states of moods and emotion. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended.
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